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THE USE OF JUROR TESTIMONY TO IMPEACH A JURY VERDICT:
THE MARYLAND PROBLEM AND THE FEDERAL SOLUTION

by Sean Patrick Casey
I. INTRODUCTION
In Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 1
independent truckers sued a trucking company ("Blue
Ridge") claiming that Blue Ridge breached a contract
by unfairly assigning favorable trucking routes to Blue
Ridge employees. On the morning of trial, courthouse
security guards mistakenly directed a non-juror to the
jury room. The non-juror sat with the jury during the
first day of trial, listening to the opening statements
and the plaintiffs' first witness. The regular jurors
believed the non-juror was a member of the panel.
The error was not spotted initially, because thirteen
jurors had been selected, and the court had excused
one of the thirteen before triaL2 After the first day, the
judge discovered the error and discharged the nonjuror from further service. 3 After a twelve day trial,
the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs. 4
The defendant filed a motion for a new trial,
alleging the non-juror prejudiced the verdict. In
support of the motion, the defendant offered an
affidavit of a regular juror. s In the affidavit, the juror
stated that during a recess the non-juror told the entire
jury that he was familiar with the trucking business
and knew trucking companies were unfair to truckers. 6
The non-juror added that regardless of Blue Ridge's
defense, he would vote against the company. 7
Included in the affidavits was the fact that a female
juror said, "she was glad this gentleman was on the
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802 F.2d 1532 (4th Cir. 1986).

See id. at 1534.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

jury because he would be a great help."8 The only
evidence of the non-juror's statements was the
affidavit. 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the trial court correctly
admitted the juror's affidavit under Rule 606(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 1o Presuming the nonjuror's comments influenced the jury, the court
granted Blue Ridge's motion. lI
If Haley were decided under Maryland law, the
court's analysis and final ruling would have been quite
different. A Maryland court would deem the affidavit
inadmissible under Md. Rule 5-606(b)12 and
accompanying case law, because it came directly from
a juror. 13 The court could only review evidence not
emanating from the jury to determine whether the
non-juror's comments affected the verdict. 14 Under
Md. Rule 5-606, the admissible evidence in Haley was

8

See id.

See id. at 1535. In Haley, the transcript from the evidentiary
hearing was lost. The court did not address the issue of whether
the non-juror was available to testify at the hearing. ld.
9

10 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
Rule 606 permits juror testimony
"whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror." ld.
II

See infra notes 91-106.

12 Md. R. 5-606(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict
(l )Inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror may not testify as
to (A) any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations, (B) the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent
or dissent from the verdict, or (C) the juror's mental processes in
connection with the verdict.
(2)A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
concerning a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying may not be received for these purposes.
13

See infra note 53.

14

See Harford Sands, Inc. v. Groft, 320 Md. 136, 145, 577 A.2d

7,11(1990).
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that an individual sat with the jury for one day of a
twelve day trial. I5
Viewing this evidence under Maryland's
"probability of prejudice" test,16 the court would likely
deny Blue Ridge's motion for a new trial. The
available evidence would not suggest that the nonjuror held a strong bias against trucking companies,
nor would the court have considered the female juror's
favorable impression of the non-juror's presence. 17
The possibility existed for the non-juror's mere
presence to have influenced the verdict, but it would
be unreasonable to conclude that the non-juror
probably prejudiced the verdict. 18
In many situations, Maryland's strict rule that a
juror will not be heard to impeach his or her own
verdict, denies litigants a verdict based "solely on
evidence presented" at trial. 19 Improper third party

15 The non-juror would be permitted to testify under Md. Rule 5606, but the Haley court did not address the issue of the nonjuror's testimony.
16 See Wernsing v. General Motors, Co., 298 Md. 406, 419-20,
470 A.2d 802,809 (1984).
Where . . . the precise extraneous matter is
known but direct evidence as to its effect on
the deliberations is not permitted, a sound
balance is struck by a rule which looks to the
probability of prejudice from the face of the
extraneous matter in relation to the
circumstances of the particular case. It is the
function of the trial judge when ruling on a
motion for a new trial to evaluate the degree of
probable prejudice and whether it justifies a
new trial. Id. (emphasis added).
17 See Williams v. State, 204 Md. 55, 70, 102 A.2d 714, 721
(1954).
In Maryland there has been no deviation from
the rule that what takes place in the jury-room
ought to be ... known only to the jurors
themselves and their testimony cannot be
heard to impeach their verdict, whether the
conduct objected to be misbehavior or
mistake. !d.
18 See Wernsing, 298 Md. at 419,470 A.2d at 808.

See James W. Diehm, Impeachment ofJury Verdicts: Tanner
v. United States and Beyond, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 393
(1991).

contact,2° dictionaries,21 media coverage,22 and a
myriad of other extrinsic forces have tainted jury
verdicts. If a competent source of evidence exposing
these improprieties cannot be found, a reviewing court
will affirm a corrupted verdict.
The primary issue in verdict impeachment cases
is what evidence a court may consider in determining
the degree of prejudice that was placed on the
deliberations of the jury. The purpose of this article is
to explain the Maryland and federal approaches to this
issue and offer an equitable alternative to Maryland's
strict rule.
The article commences with an
examination of the historical background and policy
considerations for denying admissibility of jury
testimony for verdict impeachment purposes. Next, it
discusses the Maryland and federal approaches to this
issue. The article closes by proposing that the Court
of Appeals of Maryland abandon its hard line doctrine
in favor of a balanced rule. The proposed rule
combines elements of Federal Rule 606(b) with a
variation of the local rule of the United States District
Court for the Distr"ict of Maryland that generally
prohibits attorneys from contacting discharged
jurors. 23

II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The tenet that a juror will not be heard to
impeach his or her own verdict has its roots in
eighteenth century England. In Vaise v. Delaval,24 a
party offered juror affidavits to prove that after
reaching an impasse, the jury flipped a coin to
determine the verdict of the suit. 25 Articulating what
has become known as Lord Mansfield's Rule, the
court refused to consider the affidavits. Writing for
the court, Lord Mansfield stated:
See Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125 A. 782
(1924).
21 See Wernsing, 298 Md. at 419,470 A.2d at 809.
22 See United States v. Rocks, 339 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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23
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See U.S. DIST. CT. MD. R. 107.16.
99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
See id.
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The Court cannot receive such an affidavit
from any of the jurymen themselves, in all
of whom such conduct is a very high
misdemeanor, but in every such case the
Court must derive their knowledge from
some other source: such as from some
person having seen the transaction through
a window, or by some other means. 26
American courts have since used Lord Mansfield's
Rule as the foundation for limiting post-verdict juror
testimony.27
Justifications for restricting juror testimony can
generally be divided into three groups: protection of
the jury, maintaining finality in litigation, and
preserving the jury as the democratic element of the
legal system.
A. Protection of the Jury
The first group of arguments advanced for not
accepting juror testimony is centered on the policy
goal of preventing post-verdict harassment of the jury.
Courts have consistently held that allowing jurors to
speak on their verdicts would create another way for
a losing party to pursue its cause. 28 Compared to the
appellate process, the potential for uncovering a flaw
in the jury's deliberation is an expedient and cost
effective alternative. In McDonald v. Pless,29 the
United States Supreme Court warned that if one
verdict was successfully challenged using the
testimony of a juror, the door would open to endless
harassment of jurors and change the private process
into a public investigation. 30
26

The danger is not limited to interrogations by
defeated litigants. Once a court receives testimony
from the defeated party, the prevailing party will be
compelled to gather testimony in support of the
verdict. 3! Conflicting testimony will be offered, and
a race to credible jurors will ensue. 32 In order to
discourage post-verdict investigations, courts have
deemed the fruit of these inquires inadmissible. 33
Under a similar analysis, courts have argued that.
barring the introduction of jury testimony decreases
the potential for jury tampering. 34 There will always
be an opportunity to bribe or threaten a member of the
jury during trial, but allowing jurors to testify after the
verdict will afford the corrupt litigant another occasion
to sway the verdict.
It can be safely stated that virtually all litigants
enter trial with some hope of victory. Presumably,
litigants without hope will settle their cases or accept
pleas of guilty. In many cases defeat does not become
a reality until a court has rendered a verdict. 35 By
negating the effect of juror testimony, the motive to
tamper with a jury is eliminated at the time many
desperate litigants would first consider that extreme
measure.

testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and
many would be, followed by an inquiry in the
hope of discovering something which might
invalidate the finding. Jurors would be
harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts
which might establish misconduct sufficient to
set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured
could be thus used, the result would be to
make what was intended to be a private
deliberation, the constant subject of public
investigation; to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference. [d.

[d.

See Peter N. Thompson, Challenge to the Decision Making
Process-Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the
Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 Sw. LJ. 1187, 1197
(1985).
28 See, e.g., McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915); Aron v.
Brock, 118 Md. App. 475, 703 A.2d 208 (1997).
29 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
30 See id. at 267.
[L]et it once be established that verdicts
solemnly made and publicly returned into
court can be attacked and set aside on the

27

31

32
33
34

3S

See generally Diehm, supra note 19, at 397.
See id. at 397.
See id. at 395.
See supra note 30.
See Diehm, supra note 19, at 396.
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B. Maintaining Confidentiality in the Jury Room
Another policy consideration offered is the
potential constraint that would be placed on debate
and expression in the jury room if the deliberations
Our jury system operates
were made public.
effectively only when jurors are free to express their
thoughts and opinions without the thought of societal
retaliation. 36 The single goal of deliberation is to
arrive at a fair, well-reasoned verdict. If statements
made in the privacy of deliberation could be made
public, additional agenda would develop. Instead of
open communications based on the merits of a claim,
jurors might decide cases based on the popularity of a
verdict. 37

imperfections in the jury system were broadcast to the
public. 41
A related policy consideration is the reality that
our legal system moves at a slow pace. The pace is
further delayed when jurors wait long periods of time
before revealing a flaw in the process. 42 The
combined result is that many years may pass before a
case is retried. As time passes, witnesses disappear,
memories fade, and evidence is 10st.43 It is unlikely
that the parties will be able to assemble the necessary
resources to retry the case effectively. The final result
will be another trial in which the jury renders a verdict
based on a fragment of the evidence, instead of the full
merits of the case. 44 A refusal to accept juror
testimony is partially based on the practical reality that
a fair judgment is less attainable on retrial.

C. Finality of Jury Verdicts

D. The Democratic Element of the Legal System
An additional argument is based on the need for
finality of jury verdicts. The finality argument is
founded on the premise that the jury system is
imperfect,38 but litigation must end at some point. By
prohibiting jurors from impeaching their verdicts,
legislatures and courts have deemed the announcement
of the verdict as the final cutoff. The choice to bring
closure to litigation is important both for the parties
and society as a whole. 39 If courts were to receive
testimony every time a juror made a mistake, many
cases would be retried. 40 Confidence and trust in the
legal system would be shaken if constant
See id at 399.
37 See id. at 400.
38 See Jorgensen v. Ice Mach. Corp., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2d Cir.
1947). In Jorgensen, the court rationalized that attainment of
perfection is an impossible task, stating:
[I]t would be impracticable to impose the
counsel of absolute perfection that no
verdict shall stand, unless every juror has
been entirely without bias, and has based
his vote only upon evidence he has heard in
court. It is doubtful whether more than one
in a hundred would stand such at test ....
ld (emphasis added).
39 See Diehm, supra note 19, at 403.
40 See id
36

29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 20

The jury system is based on the concept that
twelve representatives of the community will decide
the merits of the case. In the criminal context, jurors
are considered the peers of the accused. The jury, as
a representative of the community, has "the power to
decide what values will control the verdict."45 This
power is constant, even when the jury's values are
different from those of the court or the legislature. 46
See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. lO7, 121 (1987).
Justice O'Connor writing for the Court stated,
"[T]he
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions oflay
people would be undermined by a barrage of post-verdict
scrutiny of juror conduct." ld

41

See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Nicholas, 759 F.2d
1073, lO75-76 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that juror waited
twenty months after announcement ofthe verdict before coming
forward to reveal that a hearing impairment prevented him from
understanding the evidence offered in the case).
43 See Diehm, supra note 19, at 402.

42

See id at 403.
45 See Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify That a Verdict
Was the Product of Racial Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S 1. LEGAL
COMMENT. 125, 135 (1993).
46 See United States v. Powell, 936 F.2d lO56, lO62 (9th Cir.
1991) ("The concept of jury nullification allows the jury to
acquit the defendant even when the government has proven its
case beyond a reasonable doubt").

44
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The practice of permitting the jury to testify about the
deliberation process would provide the government an
opportunity to witness and control the jury's decisionmaking. Independence of thought, whether grounded
in accepted legal theory or the will of the community,
is essential to maintaining the autonomous role of the
jury in our legal system. 47
The focus of the paper will now tum to an
analysis of how the above policy considerations have
been incorporated into the strict Maryland rule
forbidding juror testimony to challenge a verdict.

III. MARYLAND LAW
Maryland Rule 5-606(b) is the rule of evidence
that addresses the competency of a juror as a witness. 48
The rule is the result of a balancing test in which the
rights of a litigant to a fair and accurate verdict are
weighed against the policy considerations advanced
for excluding juror testimony.49 By adopting Rule 5606(b), a hard-line stance against receiving juror
testimony to impeach a verdict, the Court of Appeals
of Maryland has essentially determined that the right
of a litigant to a fair trial is subordinate to protecting
the jury and the deliberation process.

A. Broad Application of Lord Mansfield's Rule
The first clear application of Lord Mansfield's
Rule in Maryland occurred in 1864. In Browne v.
Browne,5o the Court of Appeals of Maryland refused
to consider juror testimony alleging that a compromise
was reached so a sick juror could return home. Since
Browne, Maryland courts have broadly applied a
general bar excluding juror testimony, regardless of
whether the offered testimony alleged a mistake made

See United States v. D'Angelo, 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir.
1979). Without a restriction on juror testimony, "the result
would be that every jury verdict would either become the court's
verdict or would be permitted to stand only by the court's leave."
ld.
48 See supra note 12.
49 See id.
47

5U

22 Md. 103 (1864).

during the deliberations or unlawful conduct affecting
the jury.51 Additionally, courts do not distinguish
between civil and criminal cases. 52
The policy reasons underlying the general rule
are cited as consistently as the rule is applied. 53
Courts have held that permitting juror testimony
would encourage jury tampering and harassment,
make private deliberations the subject of public
concern, and remove finality and stability from jury
verdicts. 54 In Maryland, there has been close
compliance with the rule against receiving juror
testimony supported by unwavering policy
justifications, but a distinction must be made between
two types of verdict impeachment cases.

B. Verdict Impeachment Cases
1. Evidence From the Jury
Cases in which evidence of improper conduct has
been presented to courts can be divided into two broad
classes. 55 The first group concerns situations when a
juror is the only source of evidence. No distinction is
made between cases where the juror comes forward to
offer testimony of impropriety or when a third party
claims to have received evidence from a juror and
attempts to present it to the court.56 The question is
whether the original source of the testimony is a

51 See Williams, 204 Md. at 67-68, 102 A.2d at 719 (citing
Browne, 22 Md. 103, 113 (1864». Explaining the broad
application of the rule, the court stated, "[t]he law in Maryland
is well settled that a juror cannot be heard to impeach his verdict,
whether the jury conduct objected to be misbehavior or mistake."
ld.
52 See id. at 72, 102 A.2d at 722. "[T]here is no sound basis for
a distinction between civil and criminal cases in this regard."
53 See e.g., Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 145, 577 A.2d at 11;
Wemsing, 298 Md. at 411-12, 470 A.2d at 805; Oxtoby v.
McGowan, 294 Md. 83, 101, 447 A.2d 860, 870 (1982);
Williams, 204 Md. at 67-72, 102 A.2d at 720-21; Brinsfield v.
Howeth, 110 Md. 520,530, 73 A. 289, 290 (l909); Dixon v.
State, 27 Md. App. 443,448,340 A.2d 396, 400 (1975).
54 See supra note 53.
55 See Aron, 118 Md. App. at 493, 703 A.2d at 226.
56 See Zeller v. Mayson, 168 Md. 663, 673, 179 A. 179, 184
(1935) (non-juror's affidavit excluded as pure hearsay).

29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 21
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juror. 57 When the only evidence offered can be traced
directly to a juror, the law is clear. Under Md. Rule 5606(b) and cases decided before its enactment, juror
testimony will not be heard to impeach a verdict. 58
An example of the application of this law can be
found in the court of appeals holding in Kelly v. Huber
Baking Co. 59 In Kelly, a juror's affidavit was offered
to prove that the brother-in-law of the defense counsel
approached a juror and told him the plaintiffs
principle witness was a "crook" and should not be
believed. 60 After acknowledging the seriousness of the
charge, the court refused to consider the affidavit. 61
The court determined that "under no circumstances
could the affidavit be considered for the purpose for
which it was offered."62
More recently, Maryland appellate courts have
ruled that trial judges properly denied motions for new
trials when the only available evidence had been juror
affidavits alleging the verdict was tainted by racial
prejudice,63 a friendship with a member of the law firm
representing a party,64 or the improper consideration of
the accused's prior criminal record. 65 When the only
evidence directly or indirectly emanates from
members of the jury, the court must uphold the verdict
even if it is apparent that a transgression has taken
place.

In Harford Sands, the court excluded testimony of the
plaintiffs counsel and a spectator at the trial. The substance of
the testimony was that a juror had told them he was "the
strongest member of the jury" and "he was very proud he had
played [an] important role [in swaying the verdict]." Harford
Sands, 320 Md. at 143,577 A.2d at 10.
5S See supra note 12.
59 145 Md. 321,125 A. 782 (1924).
60 See id.
57

61

62

See id.
Id.

See Williams, 204 Md. at 72, 102 A.2d at 722.
64 See Braun v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Md. App. 545, 363 A. 2d
562 (1976).
65 See Dixon, 27 Md. App. 443,340 A.2d 396 (1975).
63

29.1 U. Bait. L. F. 22

2. Evidence From Other Sources
The analysis becomes compounded when
evidence from competent sources is presented to the
court. In cases where alternative means of proof are
available, Maryland courts run the evidence through a
two prong test. 66 In the first prong, the court
determines the admissibility of the proffered evidence.
Md. Rule 5-606(b) operates as a gatekeeper, excluding
testimony that flows from the jury. Evidence that is
deemed admissible under this analysis advances to the
second prong. Here, under a "probable prejudice"67
standard, the court reviews the admissible evidence to
determine if the jury was affected by the alleged
misbehavior. 68 In the second prong there is not a
bright line rule for making the determination. Instead,
the court must make its decision based on the
circumstances of each case. 69
An illustration of this two prong analysis can be
found in Harford Sands v. Groft.70 In that case, ajuror
questioned construction workers about the capabilities
of a concrete pumping machine to repair the damage.
Later at trial, the plaintiffs expert witness testified
that the same machine could not repair the damage on
the plaintiff s property. The expert testimony was
inconsistent with the information given by the
construction workers. The jury awarded the limited
sum of $4,000.00 to the plaintifCl Harford Sands
filed a motion for a new trial, alleging that the juror's
conversation with the construction workers affected
the verdict. In support of the motion, it attempted to
introduce affidavits from the juror, the construction
workers, and individuals that had spoken with the
juror after the trial. 72

See Harford Sands, 320 Md. 136, 577 A.2d 7 (1990).
See supra note 16.
6S See supra note 16.
69 See Smith v. Pearre, 96 Md. App. 376, 391, 625 A.2d 349,
349 (1993) Gudgment of the trial judge will not be disturbed but
for abuse of discretion).
70 320 Md. 136,577 A.2d 7 (1990).
71 See id. (In Harford Sands, the plaintiff, was seeking $1.1
million in damages).
72 See id. at 136, 577 A.2d at 9.

66
67
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Under the first prong of the test, the trial court
excluded the affidavits of the juror and the individuals
he had spoken to after trial,73 but accepted the
affidavits of the construction workers.
The
construction workers' affidavits were admissible
because they were based on their personal knowledge
and could not be traced back to the jury room.74 The
appellate court found that the excluded affidavits
suffered "the taint of possible post-verdict
importuning," and were properly excluded. 75
Moving to the second prong, the court considered
the possible effect the construction workers'
statements had on the jury's deliberations. 76 The court
took into account that credible evidence was admitted
to show the plaintiff s damages may have been only
$4,000.00. Failing to find "probable prejudice" in
relation to the circumstances of the case, the court
denied Harford Sands' motion for a new trial. 77
In a similar case of juror misconduct, Smith v.
Pearre,78 a trial judge instructed jurors not to watch
television programs on medical subjects. In defiance
of these instructions, the jury foreman watched a 60
Minutes episode on doctors who left the medical
industry due to their frustration with medical insurance
companies. After a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendants discovered the misbehavior and filed a
motion for a new trial. After applying the two prong
analysis, the court affirmed the denial of the motion
for a new triaU9 First, the court admitted juror
testimony of the fact that the juror watched the
program because it was extraneous material of an
occurrence outside ofthe jury room.80 After analyzing
the second prong, the court concluded, "while it was
possible that the 60 Minutes segment influenced the

jury foreman, we are not convinced that it probably
resulted in prejudice."81

C. Criminal Cases
Criminal cases dealing with the issue of the
admissibility of juror testimony follow the same
analysis. In Williams v. State,82 the Court of Appeals
of Maryland refused to consider an affidavit of a juror
that explained the verdict was based on racial
prejudice. 83 The court pointed out that "under
Maryland law the affidavit of a juror is inadmissible,
. . . and there is no sound basis for a distinction
between civil and criminal cases in this regard."84
In Dixon v. State,85 a criminal defendant filed a
motion for a new trial, claiming his Sixth Amendment
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
had been violated. He alleged that the prosecutor
privately informed a juror of the defendant's prior rape
conviction. The defendant offered another juror's
affidavit to prove that the defendant's prior criminal
history was relayed to the entire jury.86 Relying on
Williams v. State and a series of civil cases, the court
found the affidavit inadmissible and affirmed the
denial of the motion for a new trial. 87 The court did
not specifically address the defendant's Sixth
Amendment challenge. 88

81
82
83

73

See id.

74

See Christ v. Wempe, 219 Md. 627, 642,150 A.2d 918,926

(1959).
75
Harford Sands, 320 Md. at 138, 577 A.2d at 9 (quoting
Wemsing, 298 Md. at 413, 470 A.2d at 805).
76

See id.

77

See id. at 150, 577 A.2d at 13.

78

96 Md. App. 376, 625 A.2d 349 (1993).
See id. at 391,625 A.2d at 356.
See id. at 390, 625 A.2d at 355.

79
80

84

Id. at 391, 625 A.2d at 356.
204 Md. 55, 102 A.2d 714 (1954).
See id. at 70, 102 A.2d at 722.
Id.

86

27 Md. App. 443, 340 A.2d 396 (1975).
See id. at 446, 340 A.2d at 398.

87

See id.

85

See generally Allen v. State, 89 Md. App. 25, 46-47,597 A.2d
489, 499-500 (1990). In dicta, the court explained that in
criminal cases when jury misconduct or improper
communication is shown, prejudice is presumed and the burden
shifts to the state to rebut the presumption of harm. See also
Eades v. State, 75 Md. App. 411, 541 A.2d 1001 (1988).

88
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IV. FEDERAL LAW
The federal answer to the question of
admissibility of juror testimony to challenge a verdict
is significantly different from Maryland's approach.

A. Amending Lord Mansfield's Rule
The first United States Supreme Court case to
consider whether a juror could be heard to impeach a
verdict was Mattox v. United States. 89 In Mattox, the
defendant, after being convicted of murder, presented
juror affidavits reporting that extraneous matters were
presented to the jury by a bailiff and through a
newspaper article. 90 By accepting the affidavits, the
Court carved out an exception to Lord Mansfield's
Rule. The Court maintained that jury testimony
regarding motives and influences that affected the
deliberations were inadmissible, "[bJut a juryman may
testify to any facts bearing upon the ... existence of
any extraneous influence, although not as to how far
that influence operated on his mind."91 The Court
relied on precedent from state and federal cases which
advised that situations may arise where Lord
Mansfield's Rule should be amended in the interests
of justice.92
After Mattox, federal courts varied their approach
to the issue of juror testimony for impeachment
purposes. In McDonald v. Pless,93 the Court retreated
from its previous holding and excluded juror affidavits

claiming the jury created a mathematical formula to
reach a damage award. Relying heavily on Lord
Mansfield's Rule, the Court refused to consider the
affidavits. 94 The Court clarified that Mattox was an
exception to the general rule against receiving juror
testimony.95
The exception was limited to
circumstances where the basic principles of justice
would be violated without the juror testimony. The
Court determined the facts were insufficient to warrant
admission of jury testimony.
By the early 1970's, the federal approach had
stabilized in two respects. First, federal courts
excluded all juror testimony in regard to the reasoning
process employed during deliberations. Second,
evidence concerning misconduct by third parties or
other extraneous sources influencing the verdict was
generally received. 96 With these policies in mind, the
Federal Rules Advisory Committee drafted Rule
606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 97

B. Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
In 1974 Congress enacted Federal Rule 606(b).98
94
95

See Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the
Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the Broad Exclusion Principle of
Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C.L. REV. 509, 520 (1988).
97 See id
96

98

89

146 U.S. 140 (1892).

90 See id at 142-43. The affidavits alleged that the bailiff told a
group of jurors that Mattox had killed two other men.
Additionally, another juror admitted reading an account of the
trial in the newspaper. The newspaper article detailed an earlier
murder trial in which Mattox had been found not guilty. Jd.
91 Id at 149.

See United States v. Reid, 33 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 366
(1851 )("Cases might arise in which it would be impossible to
refuse [juror testimony] without violating the plainest principles
of justice."); Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., 20
Iowa 195 (l866)("Affidavits of jurors may be received for the
purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring ...
which does not essentially adhere in the verdict.").
93 238 U.S. 264 (1915).

92
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See id at 268-69.
See id

FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Rule 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict
or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any
matter or statement occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon that or any other
juror's mind or emotions as influencing the
jurors to assent or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, except that
a juror may testify on the question whether
extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror. Nor mayan
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the
juror concerning a matter about which the
juror would be precluded from testifying be

Articles
Incorporating language from Mattox, the rule permits
testimony as to whether extraneous prejudicial
information was brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was placed on a j uror. 99
Rule 606(b) maintained the general bar against
receiving testimony on jurors' thought processes in
connection with the verdict. Congress attached an
Advisory Committee Note to help lower courts
interpret the new statute. 100
Federal courts apply Rule 606(b) in the same
manner that Maryland courts employ Rule 5-606(b).101
The rule operates as a gatekeeper for evidence
originating inside the jury room. Examples of juror
testimony received under Rule 606(b) include bribery
attempts,102 knowledge acquired from media
sources, 103 and unauthorized viewing of accident
sites. 104
An example of the federal approach to the
admissibility of juror testimony is found in United
States v. Tanner. 105 After receiving convictions for
conspiracy to defraud the United States and mail
fraud, the defendants filed a motion for a new trial. In
support oftheir motion, they sought to introduce juror
affidavits alleging that the jury engaged in substantial
drug and alcohol abuse during the trial. The United
States Supreme Court ruled that the affidavits were
inadmissible under Rule 606(b) and affirmed the
convictions. Drawing a distinction between internal

99

received for these purposes.
See id.

100 See Crump, supra note 96 (citing Rules of Evidence for
United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.D.R. 183, 266
advisory committee's note, subdivision (b) (1973)). Rather than
defining the exceptions to the general rule, the note explained
conduct which would not fit into the exceptions. The note
suggested that compromise verdicts, quotient verdicts, and
misunderstanding of jury instructions were not extraneous
prejudicial information. Verdicts decided by lot or chance were
not improper outside influences. Id
101 See supra note 97.

See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977).
103 See United States v. Homer, 411 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Pa.
1976).
104 See United States v. Bruscino, 687 F.2d 938 (7th Cir. 1982).
105 483 U. S. 107 (1987).

102

and external influences, the Court held that juror
testimony on juror incompetence issues was internal
in nature and therefore barred by Rule 606(b).106 The
Court indicated that juror testimony may be
admissible in cases of substantial incompetence, but
held that the defendants' claim fell short of the
standard. 107
When evidence is offered alleging juror
impropriety, like their Maryland counterparts, federal
courts apply a similar two prong analysis. lo8 A major
difference between the jurisdictional approaches is the
standard of prejudice required for a new trial. In the
federal context, if the court finds admissible evidence
of extraneous juror contact, it invokes a presumption
of prejudice. 109 The burden shifts to the party seeking
to sustain the verdict to prove there was not a
"reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was
influenced by an improper communication. "110
Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc., III
illustrates the federal approach.
In Stephens,
documents previously entered into evidence were
supplemented with extraneous information damaging
to the defendant. On appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit first determined that
juror affidavits revealing the existence of extraneous
information were properly received under Rule
606(b). The court then held that the juror testimony
mandated a presumption of prejudice because the
extraneous material was more than "innocuous."112
Finally, the court ruled that the plaintiff did not offer
rebuttal evidence or an explanation to show a lack of
a reasonable possibility of prejudice on the jury.113
See id. at 118.
See id. at 125.
108 See supra note 98.
109 See, e.g., Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532,
1537 (4th Cir. 1986); Stephens v. South Atlantic Canners, Inc.,
848 F.2d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 1988).
110 See Haley, 802 F.2d at 1537 (citing United State v. Barnes,
747 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1984)).
III 848 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1988).
112 Id. at 487.
106

107

113 See id. at 489. The court stated that a new trial "is justified
when the verdict is so obviously rendered suspect because the
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The presumption applied in federal cases similar
to Stephens is justified because Rule 606(b) prevents
an inquiry into the actual effect the extraneous
material had on the jurors' minds. Without the
presumption, the moving party would face the
daunting task of proving prejudice, lacking any
reasonable means to produce competent evidence.
C. Sixth Amendment Challenges

In Maryland, an attorney or party in a federal
case may not question a juror without court
permission. 120 The local rule serves two purposes.
First, it prevents random harassment of jurors. By
requiring attorneys to obtain the court's permission
prior to questioning a juror, attorneys are prevented
from seeking evidence of misconduct without
reasonable suspicion. Second, the rule brings the
court into the process at the start of the investigation.
The court may set limits on tC inquires. These
guidelines prevent reasonable investigations from
developing into harsh inquisitions.
13

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
guarantees the criminal defendant the right to be
confronted with witnesses against him or her. 114 When
the jury receives evidence from an outside source and
not through trial, this fundamental constitutional right
is denied to the accused. I 15
The "extraneous
prejudicial information" exception in Rule 606(b)
addresses this constitutional concern. I 16 By admitting
juror testimony on the question of whether extraneous
prejudicial information improperly reached the jury, a
federal court may fairly evaluate if the defendant was
denied a fair trial. I 17

D. Local Rule Safeguard
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is silent on the
means an attorney may employ to investigate charges
of impropriety within the jury. Without a safeguard,
the important policy of preventing post-trial
harassment of jurors would go unprotected. 118 Many
jurisdictions have local federal rules to address this
omission. 119
jury considered extraneous material which was not properly
admitted into evidence." !d.
114 See, e.g., Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965).
Il5 See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
116 See Peter A. Kuperstein, Extraneous Information Prejudicial
If It Influences Average Reasonable Juror's Decision - State v.
Hartley, 656 A.2d 954 (R.l. 1995) 30 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 557,
558-59 (1995).
117 See also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (allowing
juror testimony concerning bailiffs comments to the jury).
liS See supra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
119 See Crump, supra note 96, at 525-28.
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V. PROPOSAL TO COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND I21
This section of the paper is a proposal to the
Maryland Court of Appeals to redraft Rule 5-606(b),
incorporating necessary changes for a clear and
equitable approach to the admissibility of juror
testimony for verdict impeachment purposes.

A. New Rule 5-606(b) - Policy Considerations
Addressed
The proposed rule balances the justifications
underlying existing Rule 5-606(b) with additional
considerations that are required to secure justice in
jury trials.
1. Fairness and Accuracy in Verdicts
A compromise must be reached between the goal
of protecting the jury system and insuring that parties
receive a fair and accurate verdict. Existing Maryland
Rule 5-606(b) ignores the need for balance. The rule
excludes "any matter or statement occurring during

120 See U.S. DIST. CT. MD. R. 107.16. Rule 107.16 provides:
Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, no attorney or party shall
directly or through an agent interview or question any juror,
alternate juror or prospective juror with respect to that juror's
jury service. Id
121 See The Proposed Rules.
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the course of deliberations."122 This inflexible barrier
to juror testimony ignores the need for occasional
investigations into the jury room. 123 The frequency of
essential inquiries into the jury deliberation may be
limited, but the courts require a means to investigate
when a valid case for inquiry is presented. A Sixth
Amendment challenge by a criminal defendant is an
instance when a court must have the ability to hear
from jurors. 124
The two exceptions in Proposed Rule 5-606(b)
offer Maryland courts vital windows into the jury
room. By permitting limited juror testimony on
external influences, a sound balance is struck. Jurors
are prevented from testifying on the reasoning process
employed during deliberations or the effect of
anything on their minds. They are permitted to testify
on the existence of external matters inconsistent with
the search for justice. The compromise offers courts
the ability to receive testimony and make
determinations based on the merits of each case.

2.
Protecting the Jury from Post-Verdict
Harassment
Maryland cases dealing with the admissibility of
juror testimony consistently cite the extreme
harassment jurors would receive if they were
permitted to testify about their verdicts. 125 Existing
Md. Rule 5-606(b) fails to completely address this
important policy objective. The present rule operates
as a disincentive for attorneys to question jurors
because the fruits of the inquiries will be inadmissible.
This argument overestimates the legal reasoning
power of the average litigant. Upon receipt of an
unfavorable verdict, a losing party may search for an
explanation of the verdict without considering the
uselessness of any information uncovered. Absent a
clear rule preventing this activity, disappointed
litigants will continue to interrogate jurors.
Supra note 12.
See generally Kelly v. Huber Baking Co., 145 Md. 321, 125
A. 782 (1924).
124 See supra notes 107-10.
125 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
122

A disincentive approach can only work if it is
focused on preventing specific behavior. Existing Md.
Rule 5-606 only collaterally addresses the solicitation
of jurors.
Subtlety has no place in effective
legislation. The goal of preventing juror harassment
is extremely important and warrants more than an
exclusionary rule. Proposed Rule X directly addresses
the need to protect the jury by forbidding contact with
jurors without leave of court. By placing the control
in the hands of the trial judge, unfounded searches into
the jury deliberations will be prevented. 126

3. Public Opinion of the Legal System
The argument has been advanced that permitting
inquiry into the deliberation process will make private
deliberations the focus of public inquiry.127 The
reality in our society is that the deliberation process
has already been made public. Jurors write books
detailing the events of the deliberation process and
appear on television programs explaining their
impression of the evidence at trial. Excluding juror
testimony to keep the deliberation process private is
overlooking the fact that we live in an exposed society
with a powerful, relentless media. When a trial
attracts attention, the media will not be stopped from
making the private search for truth available for public
vIewmg.

The Proposed Rules
Maryland Rules
Title 5 - Evidence
Chapter 600 Witnesses
Rule 5-606(b)128
Inquiry into Validity of Verdict
(1) Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a
juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations
or to the effect of anything upon that or any other

123

126
127
128

See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See Williams, 204 Md. at 67-68, 102 A.2d at 728.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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juror's mind or emotions as influencing the jurors to
assent or dissent from the verdict or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith,
except that a juror may testify on the following
questions:
(A) whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to
the jury's attention;
(B) whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any
Juror;
(2) A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
the juror concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying may not be
received for these purposes.
Maryland Rules
of Civil and Criminal Procedure
Rule X
Contact With Jurors l29
After the jury has been discharged, neither
attorney in the action or the parties shall contact a
member of the jury regarding the verdict.
(2) If any attorney believes in good faith that the
verdict may be subject to legal challenge, the attorney
may apply to the court for permission to interview
members of the jury regarding any fact claimed to
support the legal challenge.
(3) If satisfied that good cause exists, the court may
grant permission to the attorney to make the requested
contact and shall prescribe the terms and conditions
under which the contact shall be conducted.
(4) If upon inquiry the court finds that a valid legal
challenge to the verdict exists, the court may grant a
hearing to review legal challenge and supporting
evidence.
(5) If an attorney in the action is contacted by a
juror regarding the verdict, the attorney shall direct the
juror to contact the court. An attorney shall not
counselor contact the juror regarding the information
to be delivered to the court.
(1)

See Crump, supra note 96, u.s. DIST. CT. N.D. MISS. R.
1(b)(4); U.S. DIST. CT. S.D. MISS. R. 1(b)(4).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The policy justifications for excluding juror
testimony to challenge a verdict are sound. The jury
trial plays a vital role in our legal system and must be
protected. Unchecked inquisitions, bribery or threats
of violence, and an additional loss of public
confidence in the legal system will result if courts
begin to openly receive juror testimony. Maryland
Rule 5-606(b) succeeds in preventing these dangerous
results. However, the rule fails to acknowledge the
importance of an accurate verdict based only on
evidence offered at trial. An updated responsible rule
is necessary to reach an equitable balance between
fairness in litigation and the preservation of the jury
system. Maryland Rule 5-606(b) should be amended
to achieve this important objective.
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